The influence of contract type in program execution/V-22 OSPREY: a case study. by Smith, Danny Roy
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
1989
The influence of contract type in program
execution/V-22 OSPREY: a case study.
Smith, Danny Roy.












THE INFLUENCE OF CONTRACT TYPE IN






Thesis Advisor: Martin McCaffrey
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

UNCLASSIFIED
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION Of THIS PAGE
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE
la REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
UNCLASSIFIED
lb RESTRICTIVE MARKINGS
2a SECURITY CLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY
2b DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE
3 DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY OF REPORT
Approved for public release, distribution is unlimited.
4 PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S)
Naval Postgraduate School
6a NAME OF PERFORMING ORGANIZATION
Naval Postgraduate School
6b OFFICE SYMBOL
(it applicable) Naval Postgraduate School
6c ADDRESS (C/ty, State, and ZIP Code)
Monterey, CA 93943-5000
7b ADDRESS (City. State, and ZIP Code)
Monterey, CA 93943-5000





9 PROCUREMENT INSTRUMENT IDENTIFICATION NUMBER
Crystal City
Washington DC. 22203
10 SOURCE OF FUNDING NUMBERS
Piogram Element No Projea No Wwk unu Acce^iiofi
Number
1 1 TITLE (Include Security Classification)
The Influence of Contract Type In Program Execution / V-22 Osprey - A Case Study
12 personal author(S) Smith, Danny Roy









The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the
Department of Defense or the US Government
17 COSATI CODES
FIELD GROUP SUBGROUP
18 SUBJECT TERMS (continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)
V-22 Osprey Program, Pined Price Contracts, Program Execution
19 ABSTRACT (continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)
The purpose of this study was to look at the impact of a fixed price type contract on program execution of a major
weapon system The full scale development phase of the V-22 Osprey program was used as a case study The focus of
this thesis was to determine the affects of this contract type and identify the actions program management took to
address it's influences. The predominant conclusion brought out by this research was that based on the political,
historical, and economic circumstances of the period, the fixed price incentive fee contract was the best contractual
instrument for the government to use The major recommendations are: in future contracts,
- ensure an appropriate spread between ceiling and target price in order to adequately incentivize the
contractor;
- in teaming arrangements, employ incentives to guarantee the appropriate transfer of technical information,
- incentivize comprehensive production plans and Production Readiness Reviews.
20 DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY OF ABSTRACT
Fj LtNCLASSIfieD'UNUMITEO f"1 SANU ASRIPQR1
22a NAME OF RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL
Professor Martin McCaffrey
21 ABSTRACT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
UNCLASSIFIED




DD FORM 1473, 84 MAR 83 APR edition may be used until exhausted
All other editions are obsolete
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION QF THIS PAGE
UNCLASSIFIED
T245498,
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited




Lieutenant, Supply Corps, U.S. Navy
B.B.A., University of Kentucky, 1976
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of





The purpose of this study was to look at the impact of a fixed price type con-
tract on program execution of a major weapon system. The full scale development
phase of the V-22 Osprey program was used as a case study. The focus of this thesis
was to determine the affects of this contract type and identify the actions program
management took to address it's influences. The predominant conclusion brought
out by this research was that based on the political, historical, and economic cir-
cumstances of the period, the fixed price type contract was the best contractual
instrument for the government to use. The major recommendations are: in future
contracts,
• Ensure an appropriate spread between ceiling and target price in order to
adequately incentivize the contractor:
• In teaming arrangements, employ incentives to guarantee the appropriate
transfer of technical information;
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As Harvey J. Gordon wrote in his article "The Role Of The Contract In
Systems Acquisition", there are two ways of looking at any contract - from the
view-point of the "seller" or from the viewpoint of the "buyer". Contract types
used by the Department of Defense generally differ by the allocation of the program
risks between the buyer, and the seller. In the last decade, the appropriate contract
type for a given effort has been a topic of lengthy discussion.
One area of the controversy concerns the question of which contract type to
use in developmental efforts such as preliminary design (PD) or full scale develop-
ment (FSD) of military aircraft. Historically, cost-type contracts have been used
in these early phases of a major weapon system acquisition. Unfortunately, these
cost-reimbursement type contracts have, on-average, shown great overruns in both
cost and schedule. It is for this reason, that in the early 1980's, the Department of
Defense (DoD) and particularly the Department of the Navy (DoN), took a hard
look at new ways of doing business. The use of competition and fixed-price type con-
tracts were incorporated in buying weapons systems in an attempt to more equally
distribute the risk and control costs.
One program that has utilized these ideas is the V-22 Osprey. The V-22 is
a tilt-rotor aircraft that combines the vertical take-off and landing capabilities of a
helicopter with the efficient flight of a turboprop. It is being developed in a joint
effort by Bell-Boeing to perform multi-service combat missions for the Marine Corps,
Navy, and Air Force.
B. PURPOSE
The V-22 program is currently in full-scale development (FSD). The FSD
contract was signed 2 May 1986. The original acquisition strategy called for a
cost-type contract. In September 1985 a negotiated cost-plus-incentive-fee (CPIF)
contract, agreed to and signed by the contractor, was forwarded to the Secretary
of the Navy (SECNAV), John Lehman. He directed that a firm-fixed-price (FFP)
contract be implemented. The firm-fixed- price contract directive was compromised
to use a fixed-price-incentive-firm (FPIF) 1 contract. This change in contract type
made a considerable difference in the motivation and subsequent behavior of both
the contractor and the government.
These factors have generated specific questions which this study has sought to
answer.
The principal research question is:
• How did the change in contract type influence program execution on the V-22
Osprey?
The secondary research questions are:
• What was the original contract strategy?
• What were the principal reasons for changing the contract type?
• How has the change in contract type affected principal program management
parameters?
lrThe FPIF contract is frequently referred to as Fixed-Price-Incentive-Fee. The Federal Acqui-
sition Regulation (FAR) 16.403-1 states the proper terminology to be fixed-price-incentive (firm
target).
• What actions did program management and higher authority take in order to
address the influences created by the contract type change?
• What conclusions can be drawn from the V-22 program that might be applied
to other major defense programs involving similar contractual situations?
C. BENEFITS OF STUDY
This thesis will attempt to provide an independent observation and analysis of
the contractual arrangement of the FSD portion of the V-22 Program. Benefits may
be derived from this effort in evaluating the appropriateness and success of contract
type in this phase of program execution.
Additionally, the conclusions drawn from this work may be useful in decision
making on future defense programs considering similar contractual arrangements.
These conclusions or benefits may be useful to the aerospace industry as a whole.
D. SCOPE, LIMITATIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS
The major thrust of this thesis will be a case study of the V-22 airframe pro-
gram, incorporating an historical summary and the reasoning behind the contract
change. This thesis will be limited to the FSD portion of program execution and the
acquisition strategy leading up to the FSD airframe contract. It will only encompass
the areas specifically influenced by the difference in contract types, changes in mo-
tivation and attitude as the program progressed, and specific aspects that surfaced
during or throughout the program.
This study will not attempt to justify the need for the aircraft. Additionally,
it will not make hypothetical numerical comparisons of a fixed-price type contract
versus a cost-type contract. This thesis is instead a compilation, through extensive
interviews and research, of opinions and historical facts from which the findings and
conclusions have been inferred.
This effort is somewhat limited by the amount of historical documentation
available on events of the program. No classified information is contained in this
thesis. A basic knowledge of major weapon system acquisition is assumed.
E. METHODOLOGY
The methodology for collection of research data has been comprised of in-
terviews with program officials, analysis of key reports, review of the acquisition
and program strategy, and analysis of the follow-on contract strategy. Additionally,
a review was made of all documents in the Defense Logistics Studies Information
Exchange (DLSIE). A DIALOG search was also conducted with the PTS Defense
Markets and Technology Database.
F. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY
This thesis is comprised of five chapters. Chapter II will provide a history
of the V-22 airframe acquisition from its early concept until today. Chapter III
will address the specifics of the FSD contract. A summary of the interviews and
responses will be presented in Chapter IV. followed in Chapter V by the findings,
conclusions and recommendations. Two appendices have been included. Appendix
A is a chronology of the V-22 program and Appendix B contains a list of acronyms
and definitions.
II. EVOLUTION OF THE PROGRAM
A. EARLY PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT
The evolution of the V-22 Osprey program began in the mid-1950's with the
development of the XV-3. This was the first tilt-rotor aircraft to successfully convert
from helicopter to airplane mode. Bell Helicopter, under sponsorship of the Army,
designed, built, and successfully made the first in-flight conversion of the XV-3 in
December of 1958.
Research and development continued during the 1960's, but with little gov-
ernment assistance. In 1972, the Department of the Army and NASA, awarded Bell
Helicopter a contract to develop two tilt-rotor demonstrators designated XV- 15s. In
April of 1977, the XV-15 made its first hover flight and in July 1979, a full in-flight
conversion from helicopter to fixed wing. In 1980, both demonstrators met their
predicted speed and altitude of 300 knots and 16.000 feet respectively.
In 1981, the XV-15 was demonstrated at the Paris Air Show. The Secretary
of the Navy, John Lehman, attended the demonstration and was impressed by its
performance. The United States Marine Corps needed a replacement for its aging
H-46 fleet of helicopters and the XV-15 presented a possible solution. Upon his
return. Mr. Lehman directed the Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIRSYSCOM)
to make comparisons of possible alternative solutions and to include the tilt-rotor
and other advanced concepts in the analysis. In March 1981, NAVAIRSYSCOM
established the HXM Helicopter Weapon System Project Office and assigned the
first program manager in June of the same year.
The Iran hostage situation in 1980 had demonstrated a changing threat sce-
nario, directly affecting the mission of the Marine Corps. The HXM project offi-
cials decided that based on the comparisons of possible solutions, no other aircraft
could provide the effectiveness of the tilt-rotor concept. The Marine Corps, however,
feared that development would take too long and desired a more conservative, faster
solution.
In August of 1981, the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineer-
ing (USD(R&E)) sent a memorandum to the Service Secretaries suggesting that
the multiple rotary wing missions of the Army, Air Force, Marines and Navy might
best be accomplished by a single advanced aircraft such as the XV- 15. In December
of 1981, the Secretary of Defense issued a memorandum establishing the Joint Ser-
vices Aircraft program. JVX. This was regarded as approval for concept formulation,
waiving the need for a formal need statement.
The Deputy Secretary of Defense supported the Army as the executive Ser-
vice of this joint program and recommended a Marine Corps officer be the program
manager. The program was to be executed using a fixed-price-level-of-effort con-
tract, in accordance with standard Army development and acquisition procedures.
Each service was to reprogram funds to conduct a joint technical assessment of the
technology available for the project.
In February of 1982, a group of experts from each of the Services was assembled
to study the effort. By May of 1982, the Bell tilt-rotor concept was certified to be
the most appropriate technology, and a pre-bidders conference was held. At about
the same time. Boeing- Vertol had been awarded a contract by NASA to develop
advanced prop-rotor blades for the XV- 15. Therefore, anticipating a request for
proposal for development of this new joint service aircraft, Boeing- Vertol and Bell
Helicopter Textron signed a teaming agreement in preparation for the event.
In June of 1982, the Services signed a memorandum of understanding on the
JVX, designating the Army as the executive Service and assigning a Marine Corps
Officer as the program manager. In July, the program manager released a draft
request for proposal (RFP) to industry, soliciting their comments.
B. EVENTS LEADING TO THE FSD CONTRACT
Significant changes occurred in December of 1982. The USD (R&;E) directed
the Navy to assume the role of executive Service for the airframe, due to a shift
in priorities by the Army. The Army would continue the engine effort. Due to the
short notice, a temporary Navy contracting officer was assigned. Additionally, the
acquisition strategy was changed to use a cost-plus type contract and the Secretary
of Defense directed a Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council (DSARC) review
for approval of full-scale development of the JVX program.
Responses to the draft RFP numbered in excess of 250 comments. Using a
good portion of these ideas in the revision, NAVAIR approved the acquisition strat-
egy and in January of 1983. the final RFP was released. In February, a permanent
Navy contracting officer was assigned.
The acquisition strategy called for at least two contractors to compete and
the final selection would be based on a competitive wind tunnel "fly-off". However,
even though the period of performance had been extended eight months to allow for
additional evaluation and reduced risk, only one proposal was received and that was
from the Bell- Boeing team. The commander of the Naval Air Systems Command
made the following comment:
As to why no other proposal was received, it can only be surmised. Even with
the expansion of the initial effort to 23 months work, other industry manage-
ment may have perceived that the Bell-Boeing's lead and prior experience with
tilt rotors was insurmountable. Even though NASA's complete tilt rotor data
package had been made available, they apparently felt that, without a further
expansion of the effort, i.e., 33 months, the probability of winning was low.
The Bell- Boeing team had put their company resources at risk and formed
working teams while the program was still in the formative stages. No one
else made a comparable commitment. [Ref. l:p. 8]
The contract was awarded in April of 1983 to Bell-Boeing and extensive wind tunnel
tests began.
In May of 1983, the Army withdrew from the program entirely, throwing the
viability of the project in question. In September of that year the Army re-entered
after a Defense Resources Board (DRB) approved its continuation. However, the
Army would now utilize the Marine assault version of the aircraft. Work stopped on
all Army unique requirements. In addition to approving the continuation, the DRB
approved fully funding the common development of the aircraft within the total
obligation authority of the Navy. This was intended to strengthen the program by
having one Service control the funding. Congress agreed to furnish $88.6 million for
fiscal year 1984 effort.
The program was well on its way in the Fall of 1984 and a request for proposal
was released to Bell-Boeing for full-scale development. In November, the program
manager's charter was signed and the popular name "Osprey" was selected by the
Secretary of the Navy. In January it was designated the "V-22 Osprey".
In June of 1985, a CPIF contract proposal for FSD was submitted by the
Bell- Boeing team. By that time, the preliminary development phase was nearing
completion. Bell-Boeing wanted to maintain the original schedule and began some
of the FSD effort prior to the contract award. By September, the cost-type pro-
posal had been negotiated and forwarded to the Secretary of the Navy for approval.
Secretarv Lehman directed the use of a FP contract.
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Analysis of historical data for Department of Defense acquisition during the
1960's and 1970's reflected a pretty poor track record in regards to cost and sched-
ule overruns. The Defense Department each year would go to Congress and request
funding to do a specific effort. The next year they would go back to Congress for
additional funding with maybe 70% of the originally proposed effort completed.
Congress wanted to know why. There was not an acceptable answer. The contrac-
tor's reasoning of "we gave it our best effort" was not good enough. Mr. Lehman,
weary of justifying these shortfalls, wanted to create an environment that would
take the "brochuremanship" out of the process.
Cost-plus type contracts were averaging considerable overruns. They only pro-
vided the best effort of the contractor, not a deliverable. There was the appearance
of incompetence and lack of discipline. Mr. Lehman's idea was to reduce the risk in
the preliminary development or proto-typing phase of a program to a point where
a fixed-price contract could be negotiated. This would force the contractor and the
government to take a hard look at what they were signing up to and to acknowledge
the unknowns.
Bell- Boeing and the NAVAIR matrix had contended that the V-22 was a rel-
atively low-risk effort. This was due in part to the successful preliminary design
phase previously conducted. Mr. Lehman was assured that there were few un-
knowns. Therefore, when the Bell-Boeing contract reached his desk for approval, he
directed the use of a FP type contract. This would insure a deliverable and virtually
eliminate a cost overrun.
Bell-Boeing and the Navy set to redefining the contract. In May of 1986, a
FPIF contract with a target price of $1,714 billion was awarded to the Bell-Boeing
team for the airframe.
III. THE FSD CONTRACT
A. INTRODUCTION
In order to fully examine the contractual situation of the V-22 Osprey, an
understanding of the contract types is needed. The following is a excerpt from the
Acquisition Strategy Guide, published by the Defense Systems Management College
at Fort Belvoir, Virginia.
There are two broad categories of contracts: cost-reimbursable and fixed-price.
For cost-reimbursable contracts, the contractor provides best efforts to meet
the contract terms and conditions and the government pays all of the allowable
costs that meet the test of reasonableness. Risks to the contractor are minimal.
For fixed price, the contractor must provide the required product or service
at a predetermined price, regardless of the actual cost. Contractor risks are
much more severe. Cost-plus-fixed-fee (CPFF) and the firm-fixed- price (FFP)
contracts represent the boundaries of the contract-type spectrum with respect
to the contractor risk. Within these boundaries, there are a number of possible
variations.
• Cost Plus Incentive Fee (CPIF) - Used in advanced engineering,
systems development, and first production contracts when uncertainties
of performance preclude a fixed-price contract but are not so great as to
require a cost-plus-fixed-fee contract. A target cost and a target fee are
established, together with minimum and maximum fees. Cost overruns
and underruns are shared in accordance with a negotiated formula until
the minimum or maximum fee is reached. There is no ceiling price.
• Fixed Price Incentive Fee (FPIF) [sic] - Used in much the same
way as CPIF. but where there is less uncertainty in establishing a total
ceiling price. The FPIF has the same characteristics as CPIF except that
a ceiling price is established and there are no minimum or maximum fees.
[Ref. 2:5-29]
B. PRELIMINARY DEVELOPMENT PHASE
The acquisition strategy approved in December of 1982, was the combined
effort of the Army contracting officer writing the business and contractual matters,
and the program manager, writing the schedules and delivery requirements. When
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the program was transferred to the Navy, the Navy contracting officer adjusted the
strategy to comply with Navy ideology.
This adjustment resulted in a two phase preliminary design effort that preceded
award of the FSD contract. There were a number of risk reduction techniques called
for, such as: using the flight test, wind tunnel, and design data of the XV- 15,
examining a broader technology base, and competing the preliminary design effort.
Stage I had three objectives: to substantiate the JVX design; identify po-
tential problems early-on in order to reduce technical and schedule risks; and to
"conduct trade-off studies among specific operational requirements, design criteria
and configuration variations to obtain the most mission-effective system.*' [Ref. 3:p.
3]
The second stage of preliminary design which began in May of 1984 was de-
signed to protect the schedule of the 1991 deliverables by beginning work on long-
lead items. This included extensive testing leading to the detail design of the ground
test article, which was critical to the FSD flight test vehicle schedule. The Decision
Coordinating Paper (DCP) stated:
The products of PD II included defining and designing long lead items for FSD;
test of advanced composite components (i.e., the wing, wing support, hub, and
blade fold); design and construction of preliminary mockups required for FSD;
and initiation of the Integrated Logistics Support (ILS) and system engineering
processes. [Ref. 3:p. 2]
As stated previously, Bell- Boeing was the only response received on the com-
petitive solicitation for preliminary development.
C. THE BELL-BOEING TEAMING AGREEMENT
The agreement signed in May of 1982 specified an equal division of effort
which included all V-22 contracts with the government within five years after first
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production delivery. This division of effort also included any other government tilt-
rotor developments started prior to completion of the V-22. It was agreed that there
would be cross-participation in all tasks and that all data used for the V-22 would
be made available to either partner for any purpose.
In the area of management, a Bell-Boeing executive summary stated:
ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT - A steering committee com-
posed of the presidents of Bell and Boeing will provide advice and guidance
and resolve problems which may arise. Bell and Boeing shall establish a Joint
Program Office (JPO) to be staffed equally by Bell and Boeing. The Program
Director and Technical Director will be appointed by Bell and the Deputy
Program Director and Deputy Technical Director by Boeing • • •
It went on to sav
The Bell-Boeing Joint Program Office (JPO) is the single point of contact for
the government and provides overall program direction to Bell and Boeing,
including Program Policies and Procedures. The JPO, with Bell and Boe-
ing support, has negotiated the FSD contract and established the work split
between Bell and Boeing.
For the six full scale development aircraft, called for in the FSD contract, Bell
would be responsible for the wing, nacelle, propulsion, and the dynamics. Boe-
ing would assume responsibility for the development of the fuselage, empennage,
avionics, and flight controls.
D. INTENT OF THE FPI CONTRACT
When the Secretary of the Navy directed the use of a fixed price type contract,
he was attempting to limit the government's risk. It was felt that a CPIF contract
would make the contractor less cost conscious and leave the government open-ended
in terms of liability. The going-in price of the CPIF would be less than that of a
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FPI for like work, but the contractor would be subject to much less risk in terms of
cost overruns.
The CPIF contract would theoretically provide greater flexibility in regards to
changing direction and monitoring the technical and cost aspects of the contract.
However, it was feared it would motivate the contractor to be overly optimistic on
the schedule and performance guarantees.
The FPI contract would provide better budget control. The government would
share costs to ceiling, but then the contract would become firm fixed price in na-
ture, with the contractor assuming all the costs. This would greatly reduce the
government's liability.
The FPI type contract would require specific definition of the technical re-
quirements and better control over the changes process. It was also felt that the
FPI contract would require a reduction in the scope of the effort in order to meet
the budget restraints.
NAVAIR expected the contractor's position to be one of performing only the
proposed development and testing laid out in the contract, with anything else falling
"beyond the scope 1'. Unless specifically addressed in the contract, any and all design
solutions would be acceptable. However, with the government demanding techni-
cal performance regardless of cost, a higher fee was expected due to the increased
contractor risk.
Because of these expectations, it was felt that performance guarantees had to
be fully and conservatively negotiated. Additionally, the government had to address
all desired effort before the contract was signed. This meant that any work required
that could not be fully identified prior to contract award would have unknown cost
implications. Secretary Lehman had capped the program at $2.5 billion. This was
13
done in part to prevent scope changes by the government. Additionally, the timely
delivery of all government furnished equipment was essential to avoid claims.
E. PROGRAM RISKS
Although the tilt-rotor concept was not new, it would incorporate state-of-the-
art technology. The XV- 15 was continuing to demonstrate and validate the V-22
design features. The preliminary development phase had defined the performance
and dynamic characteristics to an acceptable degree. The overall risk was considered
medium.
Technically, the program called for advanced but mature concepts. Over 60%
of the structure weight would be advanced composite material. There were data
available on composite rotor blades, external fuel tanks and aircraft wing leading
edges but nothing to the extent of the V-22 fuselage or wings. Risk of advanced
composite technology was considered to be medium, but because of the extent of
this application, the risk on the V-22 was evaluated to be medium to high.
Other areas considered of medium risk were the fly-by-wire controls, the air-
frame aerodynamics, and the development of the production engine. As with all
aircraft development, weight growth posed a problem. Excessive weight growth
would adversely impact the payload and range performance. It was felt that the
fly-by-wire, advanced cockpit avionics and the advanced composites would moderate
the weight growth. However, crash worthiness and survivability requirements would
increase the weight growth risk.
F. COMPETITION STRATEGY
The competition strategy called for the prime contractor to compete vendors
for all major subsystems and components during the FSD and production phases.
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The program would actively implement policies to "break out" high cost compo-
nents. It would require a complete technical data package (TDP) suitable for com-
petition and require Bell-Boeing to compete against each other beginning with Lot
I. Bell- Boeing would be required to submit the TDP in the form of Level II drawings
at the end of FSD and Level III drawings by the end of pilot production. Configura-
tion management during FSD was addressed in a special clause in the FSD contract.
Also, not-to-exceed options would be used for pilot production aircraft. It was felt
that the FPI type contract, not-to-exceeds (NTE) for pilot production aircraft, and
competition during the first lot of production would ensure a reasonable program
and control costs.
G. SPECIFICS OF THE CONTRACT
The contract was a fixed-price-incentive-firm contract, with incentive on cost
only. It required the delivery of a production competition transition plan and an
agreement on investment in production tooling. This agreement included all vendor
tooling, both first and second source, and prime contractor tooling at a rate sufficient
to allow competition to begin in Lot I of the production contract.
The contract requirements were based on performance guarantees as opposed
to design specifications. Additionally, it called for specific fatigue test dimensions,
weight empty guarantees, and reliability and maintainability equal to or better than
the F/A 18.
The contract had a target price of $1.7 billion and a ceiling of $1.8 billion.
It provided a 60/40 share line, meaning that a cost underrun would be shared 60
percent by the government and 40 percent by the contractor. A cost overrun would
be shared in the same ratio up to a cost of $1.7 billion at which point all cost would
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be borne by the contractor, (see Figure 3.1) This equated to an 18% spread between
target price and ceiling.
The contract contained a standard eighty percent progress payment clause.
Additionally, there were ten contract line items where Bell-Boeing could close out
work and receive payment in excess of progress payments. The government would
obligate funds against the contract on an installment basis. After the initial funding,
additional monies would be authorized and made available for obligation on an
annual basis.
The contract included two production options; options 301 and 302. Option
301 allowed the Navy to order 12 pilot production aircraft at a not-to-exceed (NTE)
price of $900 million (FY84 $). Eight of these aircraft were to be manufactured
by the Bell-Boeing team, as were the FSD aircraft. Bell and Boeing would then
separately make two complete aircraft apiece for the total of twelve. The option
had to be exercised no earlier than March of 1990 but no later than March 1991.
Option 302 concerned $900 million of special tooling. The option stated that
the Navy would pay for the initial production Special Tooling and Special Test
Equipment (ST/STE) required for the twelve pilot production aircraft for a NTE
price of $300 million. Under a Memorandum of Understanding, Bell-Boeing would
then invest the additional estimated $600 million needed for ST/STE to provide a
production rate of six aircraft per month in Lot III and eight per month in Lot IV.
The contractor could recover the investment cost over a nine year period beginning
with Lot I aircraft deliveries. It had an additional provision that the government
would reimburse the contractor for all ST/STE costs if the program was terminated
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The contract also provided the government the option to acquire unlimited
rights to technical data. The option would have to be exercised within one year
of the acceptance of the last aircraft to be delivered under the FSD contract. The
contractor would provide a complete set of engineering drawings with associated
lists and documents for a NTE price of $2.5 million (FY83). Additionally, the
contractor would submit a ceiling price for a warranty, on the data supplied, for a
period of seven years or until completion of the contract where the data were first




Extensive interviews were conducted with sixteen key government and Bell-
Boeing officials. The intent and structure of the interviews was to obtain a very
candid opinion of the FSD program and contract. Therefore, specific quotes of
the individuals interviewed will not be used and instead composite views will be
presented. The interview responses are grouped into five areas: acquisition strategy,
technical specifications, issues on contract type, management, and opinions on the
success of the program.
John Lehman, in his book Command Of The Seas, addressed aircraft acquisi-
tion and the strategy he felt would best achieve the Navy's goals. He stated:
Because of all the different kinds of aircraft needed to do these integrated mis-
sions: land-based maritime patrol, land-based Marine Corps support, four-
dimensional carrier air wings, and helicopter and VTOL aircraft dispersed
through smaller surface ships, the Navy must build, produce, and operate
many different types of specialized aircraft. If that aircraft development and
production is managed in a tough competitive manner, the existence of a larger
number of production lines can be a real benefit to the Navy in bringing the
costs down through competition and optimizing for low-rate production. If
it is managed on a sole-source basis, it is a formula for unilateral disarma-
ment through the cost escalation brought about by lack of competition and
ineconomies of scale from low-rate production lines. [Ref. 4:p. 184]
His administration developed a set of principles that were submitted to the
DRB addressing the restoration of Naval Aviation. They were:
• Totally restructuring and toughening up our contracting approach, to end the
culture of constant design changes and engineering change proposals (ECPs).
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• Requiring the contractors to reorganize their production lines to optimize ef-
ficiency at lower production rates.
• Beginning to compete within naval aviation different combinations of aircraft
against other combinations of aircraft, to force all the contractors to compete
every year.
• Reintegrating Marine aviation with Naval aviation, deploying more Marine
squadrons aboard carriers, and having more Navy squadrons assigned ashore
with Marine Air Wings.
• Using to the maximum existing aircraft designs. At the time we had only one
aircraft in production that was new, the F-18. All the other front-line aircraft
were based on designs ten years old; some were more than twenty years old.
and a few were more than thirty years old. We wanted to capitalize on the
investment in these aircraft because the F-18 had cost the Navy S3 billion
before the first aircraft was produced. We intended now to emphasize sticking
with proven designs and making planned product improvement by updating
them with the latest high-technology.
• Dramatically improving aircraft safety. We were losing about ninety aircraft
per year in peacetime accidents. [Ref. 4:p. 185]
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Another of his reforms was to limit the tendency towards overspecification.
He stated:
Because of the vastness of the Pentagon bureaucracy, a huge driver of waste
and unnecessary cost in all the military departments has come to be overspec-
ification of everything. The specifications for one solicitation for cookies, for
instance, ran sixteen.pages. We found that the average request for proposal in
1981 carried so many detailed specifications that the document literally could
not be carried by one person. Like barnacles, these specifications grow con-
stantly as a result of micro- managing and spe^ 1-interest legislation on the
Hill, by the hundreds of bureaucratic offices within the Pentagon, and because
we have learned from hard experience that if you don't have a rigid specifi-
cation for cookies, some contractors will cut the price and make them with
sawdust. [Ref. 4:p. 253]
He went on to say:
Without question, competition and fixed-price contracts are the formulas for
reducing costs in major procurement. But they also can be formulas for disas-
ter, litigation, and claims if a military service does not discipline its tendency
to increase capabilities and change requirements during execution - known in
the trade as "gold-plating." [Ref. 4:p. 24]
These principles and reforms resulted in positive short-term results. The sec-
ret arv commented:
Navy aircraft procurement also shows a dramatic reversal after the application
of our reforms. In constant-year 1980 dollars, the average recurring unit price
of fiscal year 1986 combat aircraft dropped 33 percent from the average price
paid in fiscal year 1982. In fiscal year 1986 alone, that had resulted in savings
relative to the budget submitted to congress of approximately 11.3 percent.
The year 1986 was the fifth straight year when all naval aircraft procurement
programs were on a firm-fixed- price contract basis, precluding the possibility
of production cost overruns. Because the price came down on all but one
naval aircraft, the navy was able to meet the production numbers needed for
a fifteen-carrier battle-group force. [Ref. 4:p. 263]
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B. ACQUISITION STRATEGY
As outlined in chapter III, the acquisition strategy for the V-22 Osprey pro-
gram incorporated many of Mr. Lehman's principles. The government officials
interviewed echoed the sentiments of John Lehman in regards to the desired effect
of the acquisition strategy. The Navy was tired of going to Congress with a proposal
for a new system, asking for X number of dollars, and having to go back to Congress
the next year for additional funds with only half the proposed work completed.
Congress had been inferring for sometime that the Navy was incompetent in its
ability to control cost growth and overruns. As one government official put it, "it was
time to take the 'brochuremanship' out of the process". This was a reference to the
contractor down playing the risk of the effort or agreeing to unrealistic specifications
in order to get the contract.
Government officials stated that when the V-22 FSD contract was changed
from CP to FP, over 1100 specifications or requirements were removed from the CP
contract. These were considered too risky for the contractor to agree to. When
under the CP type agreement, Bell-Boeing had stated that the unknowns and risk
were minimal. Changing to the FP type contract forced them to attempt to address
and price all the unknowns.
Government officials made comparisons to other programs where the unknowns
had not been successfully addressed or determined. It was felt that this along
with "gold-plating" and the unwillingness to wait for block upgrades on product
improvements was a major reason for cost growth in other programs. Cost control
and competition in the early phases of this program were felt to be very important
because by the time the effort has progressed to the production stage it is normally
a sole-source situation.
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It was the consensus government opinion that the strategy for the V-22 was to
reduce cost growth by using more contractor risk sharing. The subject of return on
equity (ROE) was brought up and it was stated that statistics at that time showed
the ROE for some defense contractors to be very high. This was due to the fact
that the government would pay all the up front costs, while the contractor would
reap the benefits and profits. For example, all special tooling costs were paid by the
government. Additionally, progress payments were as high as 90% at one point. This
equated to an improper sharing of risk. It was felt that this improper risk sharing
and cost growth were the stimuli for the use of such ideas as early competition, cost
sharing of special tooling and fixed price contracts.
Bell- Boeing officials interviewed felt differently about the risk sharing on the
V-22 program and the government's acquisition strategy. The normal course of
doing business up until this point, was to use a cost type contract for developmental
effort such as FSD. They had based many of their business decisions on that premise.
It was felt that the preliminary development phase of the program had sufficiently
answered enough of the unknowns to proceed to FSD with a cost type of contractual
instrument. It was felt that they were as ready as any other previous program to
proceed to FSD but there were still items of the project that could not be specifically
addressed until later in the process; such as flight test requirements. These unknowns
were inherent to developmental programs and impossible to accurately price at this
early stage.
When Mr. Lehman directed the use of a fixed price contract along with com-
petition at lot one and a program cap, Bell-Boeing was perplexed. They had felt
good enough about the program, up to that point, to invest $100 million in company
funds in order to keep the original schedule intact. This money was used for the
initial requirements of the FSD effort that was beyond the scope of the preliminary
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design contract. Some of this effort consisted of special tooling and engineering de-
sign drawings. This was a good-faith effort by Bell-Boeing, therefore they felt they
had demonstrated a commitment to the program and were more than sharing the
risk by this company investment. Although they were assured by Mr. Lehman that
this money and effort would be compensated for in the FSD contract, it put them in
a poor negotiating position. If they wanted to recoup their investment they would
have to complete negotiations on the FSD contract. The general consensus of the
contractor was that it was a "take it or leave it offer" and due to the money they
had invested and the company's business base at the time, they were forced to take
it.
Government officials made a comparison to commercial contracts. The V-22
acquisition strategy should ensure that the contractor provide an honest assessment
of the true risk of the program. Additionally, the strategy should encourage the
contractor to pay more attention to the cost growth and ensure a deliverable end
item. Those government officials interviewed felt a fixed-price contract not only
accomplished these goals, but also made the Navy matrix take a hard look at what
they were requiring. If the contractor could not or would not agree to a fixed price
type contract, then the program was not ready to proceed to FSD.
Many changes resulted from the $2.5 billion FSD cap John Lehman had put
on the program; $1.8 billion of which was allocated to Bell-Boeing. It forced some
of the effort to be reduced, some of the effort shifted to government sites and some
items changed to government furnished material (GFM) in order for the contract to
be mutually agreed upon. Bell-Boeing officials felt that the $1.8 billion cap was an
arbitrary number that could be easily sold to Congress and did not reflect realistic
assessment of the effort.
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The contractors felt that one of the worst elements of the contract strategy was
the requirement to compete during Lot one. Looking at the schedule, six months
after first flight each contractor would submit their first competitive proposal. All
during flight development the companies would be in negotiation. This would en-
courage the contractors to hold back technical information in order to give each
of them an edge during competition. The contract required each team member to
certify that the other company had the necessary technical information to build a
complete aircraft. In other words, because Bell designed the wing structure, they
would certify that Boeing had the necessary information to reproduce the wing
structure at their plant. Competition during the period of design would not provide
the most effective working environment to ensure the best outcome. Bell might give
Boeing the minimum information to construct the wing assembly but hold back
ideas or techniques that would help produce it more efficiently.
C. TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS
Most of the Bell- Boeing officials and government agents interviewed felt that
the V-22 was technically ready to proceed to FSD. It was felt that the program had
gone through a detailed preliminary design phase and that most of the necessary
questions had been answered. It was felt that the program was based on a low
risk approach, on fairly well proven technology and was somewhat conservative in
technical risk.
Bell- Boeing felt, however, that neither they nor the government was ready for
a fixed price type of contract. The overall consensus of the contractor was that you
cannot do a good job at writing a fixed price contract for a developmental project.
If you could, you would not need a development program. Flight testing was given
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as an example. You can only write the requirements at a very gross level until you
start through the program and determine what is needed to be done.
In regards to this, one government official stated that the Navy did not start
"with a clean sheet of paper" when the specs were being developed. This referred
to the way the specs were "assembled". It was a "cut and paste" type approach
of "what did we do last time?". The effort was complicated by the fact that a
tilt-rotor had never been designed before. Specs were used from both helicopter
and fixed-wing projects. Some of these specs overlapped and it was stated that the
government's development of the original specs was probably not well thought out.
The contractor felt that the successful combination of fixed wing and helicopter
specs is basically engineering judgment. The development of this sort of aircraft is
a compromise of these two types of specification requirements. It was felt that
the individual NAVAIRSYSCOM matrix codes, i.e., helo and fixed wing, were very
reluctant to compromise their respective pieces of the effort.
One government official interviewed questioned the actual "value" of the gov-
ernment's input to the process; specs included. He stated that the government did
not know what they were getting into no matter what type of contract was used.
He stated that the government has a difficult problem in determining just what is
needed to address the mission effectively. This generally results in overstating the
specs in order to cover all the bases. A repeated comment during the interviews was
that there was insufficient incentive for the contractor or the government to sign up
to realistic specifications under a cost type contract. The "bugs" could be worked
out as the program progressed. A government official stated that the contractor
generally did not take exception to the requirements of the original specs even in
the areas where later it would become apparent he had no intention of meeting the
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requirements. He would give it his "best effort". While this is acceptable practice
under a cost plus effort, it is not in a FP contract.
Reflecting on this, government officials admitted this could possibly "guarantee
failure" of the program. Those interviewed were convinced that if the contract had
stayed cost type, the contractor would attempt to meet the high standards proposed.
The result would be increased cost, time, and possibly weight. The ultimate outcome
of the design would be somewhere between what the government originally proposed
and the contractor's more moderate approach. Affordability would come into play
with the significant probability of either the scope of the effort being degraded or
the program being canceled.
Those interviewed, pointed out how critical the period was when the contract
was restructured to a fixed price contract. It was critical in regards to the short
period of time spent addressing each aspect of the effort. The government had
to take a hard look at what they really wanted. The fixed price type contract
would demand very rigid specs. There were approximately three months spent on
rethinking the specification requirements that had evolved over the past three years.
This can be compared to a 12 to 18 month period normally required to develop
specifications for new procurement. It was important that Bell- Boeing expedite
the negotiations because they were funding the FSD effort and would not receive
progress payments on this work until the FSD contract was signed. The Navy also
wanted to get the program under contract to protect the original schedule of aircraft
deliveries. It was an extremely short period of time to clarify, eliminate or reduce
the scope of the specifications to a point acceptable to both the contractor and the
government matrix engineers that developed them. This scrub' required engineers
on both sides to give up things they felt were important. It proved very difficult to
do.
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The contractor stated that restructuring the contract called for reducing the
specifications to a more "realistic" level. One Bell-Boeing official stated that the
"1100" specs deleted from the contract were a number used for "spectatoring".
Meaning that each change was broken down to it's lowest level in order to increase
the number of specs cut from the contract. It was felt, by the contractor, that
the Navy was using this number politically, to justify the use of a fixed price type
contract.
Bell- Boeing felt unsuccessful in converting the specifications to a fixed price
level. It was impossible to be specific enough in writing the specs. Some of the
reworked specs resulted in ambiguities which were open for differences in interpreta-
tion. The example given was of clauses in the contract stating: "a detailed plan to
be developed". It was stated that in these areas, it was the best statement of work
that could be written at the time because of the unknown requirements. However,
a dollar and schedule amount had to be applied in order to negotiate the contract
at a fixed price level. A preliminary design review had not been done at the time
the contract was signed. Bell-Boeing felt the conversion of the specifications was
almost an impossible task.
An assumption made by the government was that a fixed price type contract
would instill discipline on both sides to stay with the original configuration and
not make changes. Cost type contracts were notorious for cost growth due to gold-
plating, additions to the scope of the contract, and improvements that "could not
wait" for block upgrades. In many cases, some cost growth was due to end running
the program manager with low level changes that would, in total, result in significant
amounts of money. It was the opinion of those government officials interviewed that
this was, if not completely eradicated, significantly reduced with the fixed price type
contract.
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Parallel development was brought up several times during the interviews. In
a cost type environment, several solutions to a known risky area might be worked
on concurrently. The idea would be to have a number of different solutions and use
the best one at the proper time. If it failed, considerable effort had already been ex-
pended on an alternative. This would help ensure staying on schedule. Government
officials felt the FP contract did not encourage the contractor to maximize parallel
development. It was stated by a key government official, that this was the real test
of the quality of the organization; its ability to effectively diagnosis the situation
and implement effective solutions. It was felt that Bell- Boeing could have done a
better job in this area.
Bell- Boeing agreed there was probably not enough parallel development. There
was a great deal of concern in controlling cost and this resulted in an optimistic ap-
proach in developing alternative methods of design. It was stated however, that in
known risky areas, parallel development was applied. One Bell-Boeing official made
the statement that there is the problem of coming up with a happy medium be-
tween having enough back-up but not over-killing the areas of concern. When there
was a choice, fewer solutions were selected over schedule protection. A Bell-Boeing
official stated that in hind sight, more parallel development probably should have
been done. The use of parallel development was acknowledged in the proposal, but
the nature of the FP contract left much of the decision process up to the discretion
of the contractor.
Government officials stated that a big problem with a fixed price contract was
that, when given a choice, it motivated the contractor to take the least costly alter-
native. Government officials agreed, across the board, on the effectiveness of using
performance specs as opposed to design specs. It was felt that performance specs
allowed the contractor some flexibility in meeting the requirements of the contract
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while insuring that the aircraft's mission requirements were met. This was especially
true where precise design specs could not be written to adequately address the mis-
sion requirements. It was felt that performance specs guaranteed the government
a good product because it required the contractor to met specific standards such
as weight, speed, mission radius, and payload. This would prevent the contractor
from making decisions based on cost that might reduce the potential effectiveness of
the aircraft. However, as with any contract, any ambiguity in the specs or contract
clauses would normally be settled in favor of the contractor. This was especially
critical with a fixed priced contract where every change or disagreement had to be
negotiated.
D. CONTRACT TYPE/PROBLEMS/ISSUES
Bell- Boeing stated that the contract type change developed an uneasy atmo-
sphere for them. It was stated that the worst thing about a fixed price contract is
the possibility of the government changing it's mind about the project and default-
ing. This was in reference to a company's ability to average profits and losses over
the life of a program and end up successfully with a profit. A fixed price contract
placed most of the cost risk on the contractor. The change in contract type did
nothing to improve their confidence in the government.
Government officials interviewed pointed out that this fixed price contract
actually improved the stability of the program. With cost type contracts, every year
a new statement of work, new proposal, and a new budget had to be submitted.
Every year the program had to be justified and there was always the uncertainty of
whether the effort would be modified due to budget constraints. Even though a cost
type contract might have allowed more flexibility for changes, it added uncertainty
to the schedule and to the continuation of the program as a whole.
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The contractor stated that when John Lehman changed the contract type to
fixed price for the same dollar amount, everyone knew the price might stay the same
but the effort would greatly change. The CP contract went through a considerable
amount of overhaul. The cost risk was shifted to the contractor. Costly items that
the government was willing to accept in a cost type contract the contractor was not
willing to sign up to under a FP contract. An example given was the single site
testing at Pax River. This would require a significant amount of personnel for a
period of approximately two years. It would be very expensive and the contractor
would not agree to the costs associated. The requirement was changed and the
testing was moved to various contractor locations.
A Bell-Boeing official stated that John Lehman had told the contractor that
he wanted them to "control the matrix". This was in reference to controlling the
tendency of the matrix personnel to make numerous changes and not stick with the
original configuration. It was hoped that this would hold down cost and that the
fixed price contract would incentivize the contractor to assist in this endeavor. Mr.
Lehman had instructed the contractor to go back and restructure the effort to a
$1.8 billion figure.
The contractor felt that the NAVAIR matrix is organized to manage cost type
contracts. Because of required approvals needed from the government throughout
the contract, the contractor felt "over a barrel" to keep them appeased. Bell-Boeing
stated that contractors never like to say "no" to customers. When estimating the re-
quirements of a developmental project like the V-22, there are unknowns. There is a
spread in the estimates that ranges from optimistic to pessimistic. If the government
says the price is too high or the specifications have not been met, rationalization
can move a figure to a more optimistic one and engineers will put more effort into
the spec in question. However, in a fixed price type contract there was no room for
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these contingencies if the contractor is to be profitable. The consensus opinion was
that the government managed the program in a cost type manner and Bell-Boeing
found it very difficult to "manage the matrix".
Bell- Boeing stated that the effort did not lend itself to a FP type of contract.
There was a significant amount of unknowns. These unknowns, however, were not
just in the technology. The prototypes had successfully demonstrated the tilt-rotor
idea. The unknowns were in areas such as composite fabrication of detailed parts and
items such as blade fold. It was felt that a larger risk might be in the development
of a producible aircraft the first time around. This type of risk is inherent in a
developmental effort.
Government officials pointed out that although incrementally funded, the V-
22 program had a payment schedule negotiated for the full term of the contract and
the effort was funded to ceiling, not to target. During each twelve month period
application was made for the next installment and it was expended based on effort.
This made it much easier to budget because the amount was set in the contract.
The bottom line was established and there was less chance of an arbitrary decrease
in funding.
However, Bell- Boeing was quick to say that because of the narrow spread
between target and ceiling, the contract was basically viewed by them as firm-fixed
price. The 18% spread provided little incentive to incorporate costly changes that
might improve the producibility of the aircraft and too little cushion for unknown
problems that might occur. These producibility items would help ease the transition
to production later in the program. Those interviewed felt that a 25-30% spread
would have been more realistic for this type of effort.
From the government's financial standpoint, there was less involvement in
tracking down costs with this type of contract. It was felt that this added a great deal
32
of stability to the work effort. It was pointed out however, that it was still important
to pursue the contractor's progress because of the termination clauses of the contract.
It could potentially get to a point where it would be more advantageous for the
contractor to terminate the effort than to continue, if the costs significantly overran.
A statement was made that one of the oversights of the government's funding policy
was the fact that no money was allocated for "misses" in the specs. In other words,
no management reserve was allocated within the government's resources.
The statement was made by Bell-Boeing that if put in this situation again,
they would insist on a true fixed price statement of work. The Navy would have
no right of approval during the design, with very specific criteria for acceptance or
rejection. The idea being, we will build it; come pick it up in x number of years.
Due to the high standards and rigid specs of the military, normally pushing the
state of the art, this is probably not very realistic. Therefore, in the opinion of
the contractor, a fixed price contract is not very realistic for this type of effort.
The Bell-Boeing officials interviewed felt the best instrument would have been a
cost-plus-incentive-fee type contract.
E. MANAGEMENT
When discussing this contract, the overwhelming subject of discussion was
the topic of management. Even in a cost type contract there would have been
management problems but the contract type made the situation worse. The inherent
problems of the teaming arrangement was compounded by competition. Those
involved stated there were many unresolved problems between the contractor and
the matrix personnel that were pushed up to the program office for action.
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A key government official stated that one of his main concerns entering this
phase was not so much the technology of the effort but the management of the Bell-
Boeing team. It was the feeling that the single most important aspect of this effort
was the ability of the contractor to correctly analyze the task within the limits of
the contractual arrangement.
One government official interviewed quoted the contractor as saying, "anyone
who attempts this effort with a fixed price contract is not in his right mind". His
response was that it had worked successfully before and it is a difficult undertaking.
But. if Bell-Boeing was not successful it would not be due to the contract type it
would be due to poor management.
It was thought that part of the management problem was that the companies
did not know each other's abilities. Each company knew they would ultimately
compete against each other and were unwilling to give up their perceived "edge".
Additionally, each company insisted that a given task should be completed by the
inefficient partner in order to ensure a level playing field when they would compete.
A Joint Project Office (JPO) was not a requirement in the contract. When
decisions were made that one of the companies did not like, there was the tendency
to either drag their feet or not do it at all. The JPO had little authority to enforce
decisions. It was felt by some officials, on both sides, that the nature of the effort,
solving engineering problems, did not lend itself to working through a joint program
office. It had the tendency to complicate and drag things out. It was felt by
government officials that more emphasis should have been placed on how the two
companies would interact.
The Bell- Boeing officials agreed that the teaming agreement was a problem.
The fifty-fifty arrangement meant that every decision had to be done by consensus.
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It was referred to by one Bell-Boeing official as the "Noah's Ark Philosophy". Every-
thing was done in pairs. Additionally, with traditional oversight by the government,
each decision involved not only one person from Bell and one from Boeing, but also
the government personnel involved in the process. It was felt by the contractor
that if the Navy wanted to use a fixed price instrument, they should have little
interaction in the process. This government interaction, reminiscent of a cost type
contract, was said to be one of the worst aspects of the fixed price FSD contract.
The comment was made by a government official that there was a startling
difference in management philosophies of the two companies; Bell and Boeing. This
was a much bigger contract than either had previously attempted. There were
differences in the approach to doing business. Textron, Bell's owners, were concerned
with minimizing short term losses. Boeing Corporation was a long-time aircraft
manufacturer that knew the industry requirements of long term investment; usually
resulting in losses in the early years of a project.
The company's cost schedule control systems were also different. Bell charged
proposal preparation to overhead while Boeing charged the preparation directly to
the individual contract. Boeing had a somewhat structured management hierarchy
that seemed to restrict the flow of information within the company. Bell, less struc-
tured, had a more free flow of information. The program was a quantum leap from
the million dollar projects of which they were accustomed and the billion dollar V-22
effort.
Company cultures were also discussed with Bell-Boeing officials. It was stated
that it would be hard to find two companies with more adverse corporate philoso-
phies. Boeing seemed more concerned with schedule where Bell was concerned with
cost. It was stated there seemed to be a lot of short term motivation in a long
term industry and that this problem was becoming more common in the aerospace
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industry today. The government is concerned with affordability while corporate
stockholders look at this year's profits and demand a respectable return on invest-
ment.
Statements were made by a government official on how, early-on in the con-
tract, Bell-Boeing was slow in realizing cost growth factors associated with the
program. It was stated that efforts by government program officials to point out
these factors were discarded by Bell-Boeing. The contractor had stated they were
the experts in building helicopters and they had proven means to address the prob-
lems. It was felt that the contractor was still in a cost type mind-set. This resulted
later, when costs started to mount, in statements from the contractor of "we didn't
understand the contract".
Bell- Boeing admitted to difficulties in gauging progress in the early stages
of the program. Because Bell made the wing assembly and Boeing the fuselage,
interaction was a source of frustration, especially when interfacing the parts. If the
mate was off an inch, it presented the problem of finger pointing as to who was at
fault.
The comment was made that the government does not know how to manage
a fixed price contract, especially when used in an FSD effort. It is difficult to
determine at the onset which items are important and which are not. However, the
common thought throughout the interviews was that if a fixed price contract was
managed right, the only risk to the government would be schedule.
A problem internal to the government was concerning the Army's decision to
pull out of the program. Many of the safeguards that were written into the contract
were based on sufficient numbers of aircraft being produced. These numbers were
based on the stated requirements of the individual Services involved. When the
Army pulled out it reduced the number by 231 aircraft. It was felt that this reduced
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level would not be high enough to ensure competition and would definitely be below
the levels needed to execute the options and ensure the NTEs for the first three lots
of production.
The contract did not require the contractor to meet the weight guarantees until
Lot one. Because of the decrease in numbers of aircraft, the government would not
be able to sustain the options for production and would now have to fund $150-$200
million for weight reduction to meet these guarantees. If the numbers had not been
cut, this would have been covered by the NTEs.
The program had no binding requirement for the Army to stay in the pro-
gram. It was stated that, as far as ensuring the success of the acquisition strategy,
the program is not only at the mercy of Congress but is also at the mercy of the
Services involved. It was felt that instability like this might discourage industry
from participating in future joint projects.
F. OPINIONS OF SUCCESS
Most government officials interviewed stated that, in spite of the problems, the
fixed price incentive contract was a good contractual instrument to use on the V-22
FSD phase of the program. Most agreed that a firm fixed price contract, however,
would not be the instrument to use. It was felt that a wider spread between target
and ceiling price would have provided more incentive and would have been more
effective.
It was felt that a major factor in the success of the program was that it was
funded to ceiling, allowing more political stability. The main drill was to avoid going
back to Congress for additional money. A government official stated that with this
type of funding arrangement, the only thing that could happen was an underrun.
The contract served the purpose of. controlling government costs.
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In contrast, one government official felt that the use of a fixed price contract
defeated the theoretical purpose of full-scale development. It was stated that if we
knew how to write thorough enough specifications, we would not need an FSD phase.
The system could go right into production. The purpose of full scale development
was to work out the existing unknowns in preparation for unhindered production.
In this type of effort, you expect to find new technologies and techniques in order
to facilitate the building of the aircraft. These developments should enhance the
transition to production.
Continuing, he stated that correcting problems from previous phases and im-
proving methods of manufacturing in this phase should lower cost over the life of
the program; that is, reducing life cycle costs. A cost type contract would prob-
ably produce a more mature design, thus easing the transition to production. It
is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to address these areas when writing a FP
contract because they are improvements or solutions to unknown problems. Many
decisions in this area were hindered because of the contract type which restricted
dollars on the part of the contractor. Even if the corporations invested the required
dollars "to do it right", recoupment would only come out of the profits achieved
during full rate production. Given the limited defense dollars and the politics of
the acquisition process, this would be a high risk venture. It was stated however,
that the contractor understood the fixes that had to be made in order to make a
producible aircraft. It would just be done over a longer period of time, and possibly
require some redesign during follow-on contracts.
Bell- Boeing officials felt that the contract type forced the making of short term
decisions. This was in reference to the low priority given to the producibility issues
that would be critical for production, during this design stage. Logically, program
decisions should be made using calculus of variation. That is, determining the total
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effect of the decision over the life of the program. Decisions made on items that
were not important now or not politically salable were just shifting cost to later in
the program. There is the tendency to compromise improvements in producibility
for less cost now. Specifically, transferring effort and shifting cost from FSD out to
production.
When government officials were asked if there was a loss of value in the product
because of the diminished priority and the shift in effort, the answer was no. The
contractor and the engineering community would not build an ineffective or unsafe
aircraft. However, with this type of contract, the minimum effort could be expected.
The question is, what would be done versus what should have been done.
Bell-Boeing officials stated that there was a cost reimbursable mentality not
only with their companies but also with the government. It was said that there had
not been the needed cultural changes to go to a fixed price type contract for this
type of effort. Their engineers wanted to do A+ work when a D was passing in
a fixed price contract. The attitude was not to build the best aircraft but to just
meet the spec. This causes the focus to be narrowed to just completing the FSD
effort. When asked if because of this, the integrity of the aircraft was in jeopardy,
the response was that there was not as much compromise in the quality as in the
schedule. A cost type contract would have substantially improved the product by
tweaking the technology as the program progressed and improving the schedule by
utilizing methods such as parallel development.
One government official suggested that, in theory, the best and most effective
way to maximize resources would be to stop work after FSD, fly the aircraft a number
of years to find problems, and correct them before production: Obviously, this is
impractical. It was the opinion of a key program official that it is impossible for the
government to completely control and monitor the costs of a defense contractor. A
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fixed price type effort is the best method of forcing the contractor to maximize cost
control.
Finally, government officials were asked if they got what they expected. The
consensus answer was that it was up to who interprets the performance specs. With
a cost type contract, effort would continue until an agreement could be made. With a
fixed price contract, there are gray areas in the intent and interpretation of the specs.
In most cases these specs would be interpreted differently by the government and
the contractor. All government officials interviewed felt, however, that considering
the political environment at the time, a fixed price contract was the only way to
avoid early cancellation of the program. Therefore, the technical compromises were
a necessary trade-off.
It was the general opinion that Bell- Boeing will be very conservative in follow-
on contracts. Bell-Boeing stated that they will not agree to assume the degree of
risk they did in this FSD contract. Bell- Boeing contended that the full impact of
this fixed price contract had yet to be felt.
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V. FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND
RECOMMENDATIONS
A. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this study was to look at the impact of a fixed price type con-
tract on the program execution of a major weapon system in full scale development.
In order to fully explore this area, the V-22 Osprey program was used as a case
study. Because the V-22 program originally planned to use a cost type contract, it
provided an excellent vehicle to contrast and amplify the impacts of the contract
type. These impacts are addressed in the principal research question of this thesis.
• How did the change in contract type influence program execution on the V-22
Osprey?
The secondary research questions help to identify and demonstrate these in-
fluences. The secondary research questions were:
• What was the original contract strategy?
• What were the principal reasons for changing the contract type?
• How has the change in contract type affected principal program management
parameters?
• What actions did program management and higher authority take in order to
address the influences created by the contract type change?
• What conclusions can be drawn from the V-22 program that might be applied
to other major defense programs involving similar contractual situations?
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The methodology used to examine these issues consisted of analyzing the his-
torical records, program and contractual documentation, and interviews of the key
program officials. Chapter II of this study provided the history of the V-22 program
and Chapter III described the V-22 FSD contract and its provisions. In Chapter
IV, extensive interviews with government and Bell-Boeing officials detailed the im-
pressions and opinions of the key project issues. The object of this final chapter
is to summarize the findings by addressing the research questions and then present
the study's conclusions and recommendations.
B. FINDINGS IN RESPONSE TO RESEARCH QUESTIONS
As stated in this chapter's introduction, the secondary research questions de-
velop and basically answer the principal research question. The first two secondary
research questions were answered in Chapter II; the history of the program.
• What was the original contract strategy?
The original contract strategy was to have two or more contractors compete in
preliminary development and culminate in a "fly-off" to determine the best design.
This would determine who would perform the FSD contract. Unfortunately, only the
Bell- Boeing team submitted a proposal and the acquisition strategy was changed.
The major changes to the acquisition strategy came, however, when the pro-
gram was entering the FSD phase. Originally, a cost type contract was to be used
for FSD but it was changed to a fixed price incentive contract.
• What were the principal reasons for changing the contract type?
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The ideology behind the change can be summarized by the following:
- The Navy wanted to ensure competition and when only one proposal was
received, other means had to be developed.
- The Navy wanted to control cost overruns and it was felt that a fixed
price contract would help accomplish that goal.
- The Navy wanted to lower the government's liability and used the con-
tract to shift more risk to the contractor.
- The Navy wanted to control cost growth caused by engineering changes
known as "gold-plating".
These factors might have been the logic behind the decision, but the principal
reason for the change in contract type was that it was directed by the Secretary of
the Navy, John Lehman. His philosophy was outlined in the principles developed
by his administration and presented in Chapter IV of this study. Basically, he felt
that competition and fixed-price contracts were the formulas for reducing costs in
major procurement.
Question three addresses the affects of the contract type.
• How has the change in contract type affected principal program management
parameters?
The interviews conducted with both the government and the contractor re-
vealed numerous areas that they felt were affected. It is the opinion of this writer,
that whether the areas identified were merely perceived to be, or actually demon-
strated to be affected by the contract type, is of little importance to this research.
If there is the perception that an area has been affected and it is felt that the result
43
was caused by the contract type, then this perception has, to a degree, affected the
process.
The interview responses were the primary source for generating the affects
of the contract type on the program. Table 5.1, is a summary of the responses.
The table is divided into government, Bell-Boeing, and general responses. Central
themes were competition, risk sharing, technical specifications, and management.
The fourth of the five secondary research questions concerned the actions taken
to address the affects of the contract type.
• What actions did program management and higher authority take in order to
address the influences created by the contract type change?
This area proved to be somewhat difficult to assess. Table 5.2 provides a
summary of the responses on the actions taken. It appeared that significant changes
in management philosophies and attitudes were made over the course of the contract.
Some actions were dramatic but others appeared to be a gradual evolution. The
individuals interviewed were quick to point out actions such as the government's
intensified monitoring of the progress of the effort or the contractor's attention to
the teaming arrangement problems. Other actions required those interviewed to
reflect back over the period. The example most often given by the contractor was,
that as the contract progressed, more and more attention was given to cost factors,
especially as the cost approached ceiling. This encouraged the contractor to probe
and scrutinize the contract's terms and conditions in order to maximize the effective
use of their resources. Consequently, the government increased it's attention to the
contract's terms and conditions.
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Table 5.1: Summary of Affects
summary op xmrn
GOVERNMENT CONTRACTOR GENERAL
Lowered government '• risk Increased Contractor risk Decreased t"* of parallel
development effort
Ensured more realistic *peci Increased rissnwirei
(BeD-Boeing felt forced
to take contract
Did not provide funding for
unforeseen problems in
original contract
Provided better coat control
for the government
BeD-Boeing had to price
unknowns




8 changes (Gold- plating)
Caused feeling of unrealistic
assessment of effort
arbitrary cap)
Placed greater emphasis on
management skiUs
y En*ur«j "good product"
I through performance (pecs
Engineers had to compromise
specs, design not fully explored
Corporate philosophies gained
importance
| Provided competition early
| and throughout the program
Forced negotiations under
pressured conditions
Increased "hand* off" attitude
of contractor
| Provided an option for a
| data rights package
BeD-Boeing felt wrong type
of contract
Increased the importance of
military services commitments
1 Provided some consistency for







1 Improved justification of
1 program politically
a Improved stability
Cap and contract type forced
de-scope of effort
Greatly increased altercations
on interpretation of specs,
requirements and contract clauses
Lessened feeling of control
(could not make changes)
Affected free now of technical
information between BeD and
Boeing (competition)
Shifted effort from government
sites
Increased GFMIncreased concern on
prodliability
Slowed progress by inefficient
team member doing task
(competition)
Rushed conversion of specs
and requirements (during
contract change)
CP management on a FP
contract
Shifted focus
a) To cost (schedule impacted)
b) To look primarily at FSD
phase (production impacted)
c) From long term to short term






Table 5.2: Summary of Actions Taken
SUMMARY Of ACTIONS TAkEN
GOVERNMENT CONTRACTOR
Placed more emphasis on contract term and condition* Placed more emphasis on contract terms and condition*
Placed more emphasis on control at change* Shifted emphasis to cost vs. schedule/technical
Increased informal negotiation/communication with contractor Increased attention to risk
Increased attention on transition to production concern* Focused on completion of PSD contract
Changed mind-aet to FP Changed mind-set to FP
Placed more attention on schedule/monitoring progress Increased communication between engineers
and management
More closely monitored quality of product Placed more emphasis on management/
teaming agreement
Placed more emphasis on ensuring level playing
field for future competition
Other management actions also developed as the contract progressed. The im-
portance of schedule and determining the critical path escalated. As these problems
developed, attention to management abilities increased. The importance of parallel
development became more apparent in this case because of the reduced effort in this
area.
Another area that gained attention over the course of the contract was transi-
tion to production. As costs increased and requirements were scrutinized, concerns
developed on the producibility of the aircraft. If Bell- Boeing was making decisions
focused just on completing the FSD contract, it might result in redesign requirements
during production. This changed the focus of attention for government officials.
The greatest area of change was the mind-set of using a fixed price type con-
tract. The FP contract required more analysis on proposed changes and improve-
ments because each change required contract modification. Both sides stated that
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this was very difficult. Bell-Boeing felt that the government never made the change
in mind-set; especially the Navy's matrix engineers. The contractor felt the matrix
disregarded the fact that it was a fixed price contract and could accomplish their
requests, at the contractor's expense, because of the approval clauses in the con-
tract. The clauses required approval from the appropriate matrix codes in order to
proceed to the next stage of effort.
Government officials conceded that it was very difficult to determine how much
to intervene in the process. The fixed price contract reduced their ability to make
changes, however, it was their responsibility to procure a good product while en-
suring the effective and appropriate use of public funds. This greatly increased
communication with the contractor.
The last of the secondary research questions was:
• What conclusions can be drawn from the V-22 program that might be applied
to other major defense programs involving similar contractual situations?
This question will be addressed in the following section on the conclusions that
can be drawn from the study.
C. CONCLUSIONS DRAWN FROM THE FINDINGS
The Navy Program Manager's Guide states:
It is Department of Defense policy that contract types be employed that are
appropriate, considering all the facts and circumstances involved in a spe-
cific acquisition. The principal distinction between various contract types lies
in the degree of risk assumed by the parties and in the appointment of re-
sponsibility. To the extent that the selected contract type reflects a fair and
reasonable apportionment of risk and responsibility between the government
and the contractor, the contract is more likely to facilitate the efficient con-
duct of a program. When unilaterally imposed as a substitute for effective
program management, either by inadvertently or by design, an inappropri-
ate contract becomes the source of needless, unproductive, and costly contro-
versy. [Ref. 5: pp. 4-23]
47
The guide defines full scale development in the following paragraph:
The goal of the FSED phase is to produce a fully tested, documented, and
production-engineered design of the concept selected in the D&V (demonstra-
tion and validation) Phase. This design must be cost-effective, operationally
suitable, and producible. It is developed through an iterative process of design
and test-redesign ... [Ref. 5:pp. 1-16]
When comparing this definition of full-scale development with the "textbook"
or historical uses for fixed price incentive contracts, there seems to be a mismatch.
Looking back on the compilation of the history, research, and interview responses of
this thesis, there is a question that must be addressed. What was the main objective
of the V-22 FSD acquisition strategy?
In regards to cost control and reducing the government's liability, the fixed
price contract accomplished the following:
• Controlled engineering changes
• Demanded a thorough and realistic evaluation of the specifications and re-
quirements
• Eliminated the possibility of requiring additional government funds for the
effort addressed in the original contract
• Shifted cost risk and cost monitoring responsibility to the contractor
• Improved political stability.
Given the aforementioned, it is concluded, that the fixed price in-
centive firm contract was appropriately used to control costs and reduce
the government's financial liability on the V-22 Osprey FSD program.
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In regards to ensuring the best aircraft being developed, with a mature design
that was unquestionably ready for production, the fixed price contract resulted in
the following points:
• Incentivized the contractor to focus his attention on cost factors and away
from the optimal technical design
• Because of government approval requirements in the contract, it did not effec-
tively control the Navy's engineering matrix codes
• Contract incentives were unsuccessful in motivating the contractor to make de-
cisions that would improve producibility and effectively address the transition
to production
• Although modifications to the contract were an option, the fixed price contract
was not flexible enough to maximize the developmental effort of the program
(i.e., any change to the effort required a contract modification and equitable
adjustment)
• Because of the nature of the effort, the contract produced arbitrary clauses and
specifications that were open for differences in interpretation and increased the
legal liability of the government
The transition to production was an area of great concern for the V-22 pro-
gram. The Navy Program Manager's Guide states:
Transition to Production. Transition from development to production is not a
discreet event. It is an ongoing process which begins with system conceptual-
ization and continues through design, test and production. For instance, plan-
ning for production must begin during the design when production engineers
work with design engineers to ensure that a producible system is designed.
Conversely, design engineers on the factory floor ensure that design related
production problems are factored into a producible redesign . . . [Ref. 5:pp.
3-40]
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One of the primary considerations during FSD should be the successful tran-
sition from development to production. Although the tilt-rotor concept was consid-
ered mature technology, an aircraft of this size and requirements presented many
unknowns. The V-22's extensive use of composites, fly-by-wire technology, and
airframe aerodynamics presented challenges that would require "design and test-
redesign".
It is therefore concluded, that the fixed price incentive firm con-
tract used on the V-22 FSD Osprey program was not the most effective
instrument to ensure the best and most comprehensive technical design.
The political decisions to use fixed price type contracts on developmental
projects certainly generated controversy. The question is whether the controversy is
"needless, unproductive or costly". [Ref. 5:pp. 4-23] SECNAV Instruction 4210.6 of
20 November 1985, in effect when this contract was ultimately awarded, contained
the following paragraph in section 4c:
Policy
A Systems Commander will not proceed to Milestone II, for a decision to pro-
ceed with FSED, until he is satisfied that advanced development has reduced
risks sufficiently to enable the contractors to commit to a fixed price type con-
tract that includes not-to-exceed (NTE) prices or priced production options
....[Ref. 6:p. 1]
This ideology changed. Department of Defense Directive 5000.1 of September
1, 1987 contains the following clause in section 9g:
Tailored Acquisition Strategy
Contract type shall be consistent with all program characteristics including
risk. Fixed price contracts are normally not appropriate for research and de-
velopment phases. For such efforts, a cost-reimbursable contract is preferable
because it permits an equitable and sensible allocation of program risk between
the contracting parties. [Ref. 7:p. 6]
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This clause is interpreted to mean that the use of a fixed price type contract
will not be used on future projects such as the V-22 FSD effort unless unusual
circumstances warrant. The change in policy is an attempt to more closely match
the contract type to the risk of the effort. As stated in the Navy Program Manager's
Guide, the contract type should reflect the fair and reasonable apportionment of risk
and responsibility between the government and the contractor.
The political environment of any major weapon system program is unques-
tionably an area that requires risk analysis. However, this area often times does not
receive formal or detailed evaluation. This is not to say that politics are overlooked.
In the case of the V-22 Osprey, the political environment at the time played
a significant role. Not only was it a Marine Corps project, it took place during a
period when cost overruns were commonplace and programs were being canceled due
to afford ability. Defense contractors were constantly in the headlines for every reason
imaginable, including fraud. It was the general feeling on the part of the government
that defense contractors were gaming the process and high ROE statistics reinforced
those assumptions. The apparent goal of government officials was to prove that costs
of major weapons systems could be controlled.
The importance of evaluating the political risks in a major weapon system
acquisition such as the V-22, cannot be overstated. When Dick Cheney was selected
as Secretary of Defense in early 1989, one of his first actions was to cancel the V-22
program. Although the program was behind in schedule, the fixed price contract
had served its purpose in controlling government costs. Additionally, the Osprey
had successfully completed first flight in March of 1989. To that point, the program
had successfully completed virtually everything that had been originally proposed
and without excessive schedule slippage. The Navy submitted a reclama to OSD
concerning Secretary Cheney's decision but the DRB supported the cancellation.
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Congress immediately passed a unanimous "sense of the Senate" resolution sup-
porting the restoration of the program. This was to say that they were not in favor
of the decision to cancel the program. In November of 1989 the defense bill approved
by the House and Senate conferees provided $255 million to continue the research
and development effort. As the interviews have supported, a CPIF contract would
have increased the likelihood of the cost exceeding the ceiling limit. The point is, if
the program had been over budget in addition to behind in schedule, there might
have been less congressional support.
It is therefore concluded, based on the political, historical, and eco-
nomic circumstances of the period, that the fixed price incentive firm
contract was the appropriate contractual instrument to use on the V-22
Osprey FSD effort. The technical compromises were justified as trade-offs
to promote program stability.
Finally, to have a successful program, it must be pointed out that the built-in
safeguards of the contract must be supported and used to their full potential. The
NTE safeguards built into the V-22 contract were based on sufficient numbers of
aircraft. When the Army arbitrarily pulled out of the program, the strength of the
contract faltered.
The reduction placed the number of remaining aircraft below the level needed
to execute the options and thus ensure the NTEs for the first three lots of production.
Additionally, it was not feasible, at that level, to economically engage competition.
The Army's pull-out and the resulting reduction in aircraft voided an important
safeguard in the contract.
It is therefore concluded, that joint programs must ensure the sup-
port and commitment of all Services involved in order to protect the
government's overall position and present one face to industry.
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D. RECOMMENDATIONS
The following recommendations are offered as a result of this study:
• On any incentive type contract, the spread between target price and ceiling
price should reflect the degree of risk facing the contractor. It should be large
enough to provide sufficient incentive for the contractor to adequately address
the goal of the effort.
• In a teaming arrangement, incentives should be employed to effectively guar-
antee the appropriate transfer of technical information. This is especially true
if competition is advocated early in the program's life cycle. An example of
this might be to guarantee a percentage work split between the contractors
during the initial production contract. Another example might be an award
fee arrangement based on the completeness or quality of the TDP and transfer
between companies.
• The contractor should be incentivized to develop a comprehensive production
plan culminating in a Production Readiness Review (PRR). A PRR is ' 4 a
formal examination of a program to determine whether the design is ready
for production, production engineering problems have been resolved, and the
producer has accomplished adequate planning for the production phase." [Ref.
25:p. A-8] Adequately incentivizing successful PRR's will help ensure that the
product is producible and ease the transition to production.
• Department of Defense policy should be developed to control changes in the
participation of the individual Services in a joint program. Services should
be contractually responsible and required to compensate the program for the
impact of their actions. This might be compared to compensation required
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when a termination for convenience occurs. These restrictions would help to
protect contract safeguards and DoD investments.
• Future projects should ensure that risk sharing and contractual negotiations be
conducted under mutual agreement of the parties involved in order to promote
a better working environment. This is especially important on development
projects.
E. FURTHER RESEARCH
One of the findings of this study indicated that the contract type and its
influences could have a significant impact on follow-on effort. It is suggested that
the continued study of the V-22 program could prove beneficial. Specific questions
might be:
• What has been the technical short fall caused by the contract type?
- Were the short falls addressed/discovered during Development Test/-
Operational Test (DT/OT)?
• What is the projected dollar savings/loss that can be attributed to the contract
type?
• What effect does such a contract have on subvendors to the prime? (i.e., Were
they forced to go FP?)
• What effect has such government actions, and the resultant low ROE or losses
by industry, had on companies willing to do defense contract work?
Additional research on the Allison engine contract might also prove to be




DECEMBER 1958 XV-3 FIRST FULL INFLIGHT CONVERSION
FROM HELICOPTER TO FIXED WING AIRCRAFT
1972 DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY AND NASA
AWARDED BELL HELICOPTER CONTRACT TO




1977 XV-15 FIRST HOVER FLIGHT
1979 XV-15 FULL IN-FLIGHT CONVERSION
FROM HELICOPTER TO FIXED WING AIRCRAFT
1980 BOTH XV-15 DEMONSTRATORS MEET THEIR
PREDICTED SPEED AND ALTITUDE: 300 KNOTS
- 16,000 FEET
1981 PARIS AIR SHOW DEMONSTRATION OF XV-15
HXM MISSION ELEMENT NEEDS STATEMENT
APPROVED BY DOD
HXM HELICOPTER WEAPON SYSTEM PROJECT
OFFICE ESTABLISHED
JUNE 1981 PROGRAM MANAGER ASSIGNED TO
HXM PROJECT
AUGUST 1981 UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (RESEARCH
AND ENGINEERING) MEMORANDUM FOR
COMMON SOLUTION CONSIDERATION ON
NAVY AND AIR FORCE REQUIREMENTS




1981 MILESTONE - DEPUTY SECRETARY
OF DEFENSE DECISION MEMORANDUM
ESTABLISHING THE JOINT SERVICES
AIRCRAFT PROGRAM (JVX)
1981 BOEING AWARDED NASA CONTRACT
TO DEVELOP ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY
COMPOSITE PROPROTOR BLADES FOR
THE XV-15
FEBRUARY 1982 JOINT TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT GROUP
(JTAG) COMPRISED OF ALL SERVICES
CONVENE TO DISCUSS ALTERNATIVE
DESIGNS FOR ALL SERVICE AIRCRAFT
MAY 1982 JTAG CHOOSES TILTROTOR DESIGN AS BEST
ALTERNATIVE
PRE-BIDDERS CONFERENCE HELD
TEAMING AGREEMENT SIGNED BY BELL
HELICOPTER TEXTRON, INC. AND
BOEING-VERTOL COMPANY
JUNE 1982 ARMY, NAVY AND AIR FORCE SIGN A
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING
ON THE JVX
ARMY DESIGNATED EXECUTIVE SERVICE
PROGRAM MANAGER DESIGNATED FOR JVX
SEPTEMBER 1982 CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
EXECUTIVE BOARD (CED) MEETS
TO DISCUSS JVX
JVX ACQUISITION STRATEGY APPROVED BY
CHIEF OF NAVAL MATERIAL
NOVEMBER 1982 OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
HOLDS PROGRAM REVIEW
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NAVY REPLACES ARMY AS THE
EXECUTIVE SERVICE
NAVY JVX CONTRACTING OFFICER APPOINTED
NAVY CHANGES THE ARMY'S CONTRACT
STRATEGY FROM FIXED PRICE LEVEL
OF EFFORT TO COST-PLUS
MILESTONE I - SDDM DIRECTS A DEFENSE
SYSTEMS ACQUISITION REVIEW COUNCIL
(DSARC) REVIEW FOR APPROVAL
FULL-SCALE DEVELOPMENT OF JVX PROGRAM
JANUARY 19S3 NAVAL AIR SYSTEMS COMMAND
APPROVES ACQUISITION STRATEGY
REQUESTS FOR PRELIMINARY DESIGN
PROPOSALS ISSUED
FEBRUARY 19S3 SECOND NAVY CONTRACTING
OFFICER APPOINTED
BELL-BOEING TEAM SUBMITS ONLY PROPOSAL
FOR PRELIMINARY DESIGN
APRIL 1983 PRELIMINARY DESIGN CONTRACT PHASE I
AWARDED TO BELL-BOEING TEAM
EXTENSIVE WIND TUNNEL TESTS BEGIN AT
BELL-BOEING
MAY 1983 ARMY WITHDRAWS FROM JVX PROGRAM
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SEPTEMBER 1983 DEFENSE RESOURCES BOARD (DRB)
APPROVES CONTINUATION OF JVX
DEVELOPMENT AS A JOINT NAVY/AIR FORCE
PROGRAM WITH FULL FUNDING FOR COMMON
DEVELOPMENT AND NAVY HAVING TOTAL
OBLIGATION AUTHORITY
WORK STOPPED ON ARMY UNIQUE
REQUIREMENTS
NOVEMBER 1983 $88.6 MILLION IN RDT&E
PROVIDED IN FISCAL YEAR 1984
MAY 1984 PRELIMINARY DESIGN CONTRACT
PHASE II AWARDED
RFP ISSUED FOR FULL SCALE DEVELOPMENT
JUNE 1984 NAVAL AIR SYSTEMS COMMAND APPROVES
MODIFIED ACQUISITION STRATEGY A-42-37-0-40
AUGUST 19S4 CHIEF OF NAVAL MATERIAL APPROVES
MODIFIED ACQUISITION STRATEGY
SEPTEMBER 19S4 REVISED RFP RELEASED TO
BELL-BOEING TEAM FOR FULL-SCALE
DEVELOPMENT
NOVEMBER 1984 PROGRAM MANAGER'S CHARTER SIGNED
"OSPREY" SELECTED AS POPULAR NAME BY
SECRETARY OF NAVY
JANUARY 1985 OSPREY DESIGNATED "V-22"
FEBRUARY 1985 COST-PLUS-INCENTIVE-FEE
CONTRACT PROPOSAL SUBMITTED BY
BELL-BOEING
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JUNE 1985 FSD EFFORT STARTED AT BELL-BOEING
SEPTEMBER 1985 SECRETARY OF NAVY DIRECTS
FIXED-PRICE TYPE CONTRACT BE
UTILIZED FOR FSD EFFORT
DECEMBER 1985 ALLISON ENGINE SELECTED
APRIL 1986 MILESTONE II REVIEW HELD BY THE
DSARC COUNCIL
MAY
SAR REFLECTS THE ADDITION OF THE
ARMY/AIR FORCE REQUIREMENTS IN
ACCORDANCE WITH THE MAY 1986 DCP
1986 SDDM APPROVES FULL-SCALE
DEVELOPMENT OF V-22 OSPREY
FSD CONTRACT SIGNED WITH
BELL-BOEING TEAM
ALLISON ENGINE CONTRACT SIGNED
NOVEMBER 1986 NTE OPTIONS FOR FIRST THREE
LOTS OF AIRCRAFT PRODUCTION
NEGOTIATED AND SUBMITTED - TO BE
INCORPORATED IN THE FSD CONTRACT
DECEMBER 1986 CRITICAL DESIGN REVIEW COMPLETED
JOINT REQUIREMENTS AND MANAGEMENT
BOARD AUTHORIZES CONTINUANCE OF
THE DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM
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FEBRUARY 1988 ARMY WITHDRAWS FROM THE PROGRAM
(STATED HIGHER PRIORITY REQUIREMENTS
AND CONSTRAINED FISCAL SITUATION)
MAY 1988 V-22 OSPREY ROLLOUT AT BELL
HELICOPTER, ARLINGTON, TEXAS
JULY 1988 PROGRAM BUDGET DECISION FOR FY-89
APPROVES SOLE SOURCE PROCUREMENT
PROFILE
SEPTEMBER 1988 JOINT CONFERENCE COMMITTEE
DIRECTS THE UNDER SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE FOR ACQUISITION (USDA) TO
REVIEW THE V-22 ACQUISITION STRATEGY
AND DETERMINE IF COMPETITION IS STILL
WARRANTED
DECEMBER 19SS BELL-BOEING TEAM SUBMITS NEW
NOT-TO-EXCEEDS (NTEs) FOR 12
CO-PRODUCED AIRCRAFT
JANUARY 1989 UNDER SECRETARY OF NAVY DIRECTS
PROCUREMENT USING A COMPETITIVE
ACQUISITION STRATEGY
PRESIDENT'S BUDGET IS SUBMITTED TO
CONGRESS V-22 IS SUBMITTED IN ACCORDANCE
WITH THE SOLE SOURCE PROFILE APPROVED
AT 14 JULY 1988 PBD
ENGINE PRODUCTION CONTRACT AWARDED TO
ALLISON - EXERCISE LOT PRODUCTION BY
PLACING LONG LEAD FUNDS (LLF) AGAINST
THE CONTRACT
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FEBRUARY 1989 LLF PLACED AGAINST AIRFRAME
CONTRACT - OPTIONS 301/302 EXERCISED
MARCH 1989 ACQUISITION PLAN REVISED TO SOLE
SOURCE PROFILE
APRIL
SUCCESSFUL FIRST FLIGHT CONDUCTED AT
BELL HELICOPTER, ARLINGTON, TEXAS
REVISED R&D TEST AND EVALUATION MASTER
PLAN (TEMP) APPROVED
1989 TENTATIVE DRB DECISION TO CANCEL
PROGRAM
DEPARTMENT OF NAVY RECLAMA TO OSD
DRB DECISION TO CANCEL PROGRAM
UNANIMOUS "SENSE OF THE SENATE"
RESOLUTION PASSED SUPPORTING
RESTORATION OF V-22 PROGRAM
NOVEMBER 1989 CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES APPROVE







ARB Acquisition Review Board
CDR Critical Design Review
CEB CNO Executive Board
CO Contracting Officer
CPAF Cost Plus Award Fee
CPFF Cost Plus Fixed Fee
CPIF Cost Plus Incentive Fee
DCP Decision Coordinating Paper
DLSIE Defense Logistics Studies Information Exchange
DOD Department of Defense
DON Department of the Navy
DRB Defense Resources Board
DSD Deputy Secretary of Defense
DT Development Test
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ECP Engineering Change Proposal
FFP Firm Fixed Price
FP Fixed-Price
FPIF Fixed-Price Incentive Firm
FSD Full-Scale Development (Phase)
GFE Government- Furnished Equipment
ILS Integrated Logistics Support
JTAG Joint Technology Assessment Group
LCC Life-Cycle Cost
LLF Long Lead Funds
LOE Level of Effort
MOA Memorandum of Agreement
MOU Memorandum of Understanding
NAYAIR Naval Air Systems Command
NASA National Air and Space Administration
NTE Not-to-exceed
OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense
OT&E Operational Test and Evaluation
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PD Preliminary Design
PDR Preliminary Design Review
PM Program Manager
PTA Point of Total Assumption
RDT&E Research, Development, Test and Evaluation
RFP Request For Proposal
SAR Selected Acquisition Report
SDDM SECDEF Decision Memorandum
SECDEF Secretary of Defense
SECNAY Secretary of the Navy
SOW- Statement of Work
ST Special Tooling
STE Special Test Equipment
SYSCOM Systems Command
TDP Technical Data Package
TEMP Test and Evaluation Master Plan
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